England have forced Australia to change their tactics, but selection errors have cost them

Pat Cummins and Ben Stokes have different captaincy styles but they both possess the same admirable trait of seeking victory from the opening delivery.

One of the big differences between the two is Stokes' desire for his batters to attack, which has forced Cummins to employ some defensive strategies. It's not desirable to give good players an easy single at the start of an innings, and you are trusting luck by trying to dismiss a sensible batter with a bouncer barrage. These were tactics Cummins employed at different times during the series, and while they were dubious ploys, the question applies: "Why did senior players allow him to continue using such repetitive tactics that weren't working?"

One aim of a good cricket team is to make the opposition change their tactics, whether that be a team strategy or an individual one. England achieved that aim, but because they made some poor selection choices, they still trail in the series.

There were critics of Stokes' decision to declare at Edgbaston and bat on at Old Trafford. These are smokescreens; his tactics were right and were both aligned with Stokes' stated desire to always push for victory. Any captain who calculates a declaration according to a weather forecast - as was suggested of Stokes at Old Trafford - is asking for trouble.

What has to be queried is England's poor record at the selection table. This series they have mistakenly plumped for Jonny Bairstow, a recognised batter, ahead of the far superior wicketkeeper Ben Foakes. They opted to court Moeen Ali, an offspinner who bats but even at his peak didn't relish the challenge of playing Australia. England also preferred a seam attack that lacked variety before belatedly unleashing a genuine speedster against Australia in the third Test. England then failed to give Mark Wood the advantage of using a hard new ball.

These are all errors that are difficult to overcome, even when accompanied by an admirable desire to prioritise run-scoring and wicket-taking. This is especially the case when England's captain and coach have a considerable say in selection.

Defensive fielders highlight a desire among modern captains to protect boundaries, thereby allowing easy singles. There are times when this is a questionable policy despite the dramatic improvement in modern bats. If a batter hits a boundary, he is still facing the next ball, but a single frees him from the strike and lets him enjoy the safety of the non-striker's end. A captain who disperses the field with no close catching men and the bulk of the fielders on the boundary is greatly reducing the effectiveness of an attacking bowler. If a captain places nine men on the boundary, any self-respecting bowler is entitled to say: "You want that field then you bowl to it."

Captaincy is subjective; there is never universal agreement on tactics, especially when a game is lost. A captain must hold his nerve and expect good, positive suggestions from his senior fielders. I liken captaincy to a computer - others can provide an input, but it's the captain who has to make the final decision.

Both Cummins and Stokes have been the right choice as respective leaders. In Cummins' case he's a good captain and deserves to retain the position. However, he may be listening to too much advice, not all of it from people qualified for the job.

Critics would do well to recall that under Cummins' captaincy Australia hold both the World Test Championship title and the Ashes urn.

Cummins displayed his worth in The Oval Test by learning from past mistakes. After sending England in on a pitch that had some life for the bowlers, Australia dismissed their opponents for a reasonable total despite some sloppy fielding.

The Test is now poised to end in a one-innings shootout with the series finishing - as it began - in a sprint for victory. Whatever the respective merits of the two captains, the teams have provided ample entertainment and a series to be remembered.